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INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that a boy,
fourteen years old at the time he was sexually victimized by an adult
woman, was responsible for the financial support of the resultant child.' In
this case, the petitioner/mother L.M.E. was six years older than the respondent/father A.R.S. at the time of the sexual misconduct and was married to
another man.2 L.M.E. gave birth to B.M.E. while married and initially
named her husband, D.L.E., as B.M.E.'s father.3 After L.M.E. and D.L.E.
divorced eleven years after the birth of B.M.E., it was determined that, in
fact, A.R.S. was the father of B.M.E.4 L.M.E. petitioned for paternity and
an order of child support against A.R.S., but A.R.S. objected, stating that
B.M.E. was born as a result of L.M.E.'s criminal sexual victimization of
A.R.S. when he was fourteen years old, and that a child support judgment
1.
App. 2004).
2.
3.
4.

L.M.E. & Family Independence Agency v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct.
Id.at 905.
Id.
Id.
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5
would allow L.M.E. to profit from her crime. The trial court applied "equitable principles" to find that A.R.S. was not responsible for the financial
support of B.M.E., and L.M.E. appealed.6
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of A.R.S.'s alleged victimizafound that because L.M.E. had never been charged with any crime
and
tion
related to the conception, the trial court erred when it held that A.R.S. was
7
not liable for child support on behalf of B.M.E. The Court of Appeals of
Michigan held that A.R.S. was only "technically" a victim of a criminal sex
act and that the record reflected his willing participation in the sexual inter8
course with L.M.E. that resulted in B.M.E. The court reasoned that L.M.E.
did not benefit from the imposition of the judgment, as A.R.S. argued, but
9
rather the award served the interests of B.M.E. The court stressed that the
public policy of the state is to "secure support for children," and that the
imposition of a child support judgment in a situation where the child's conception was the result of sexual victimization by the child's mother upon
1'
the child's father served this "important public policy." L.M.E. & Family
Independence Agency v. A.R.S. illustrates the way in which all courts faced
with similar fact patterns have handled the issue of child support."
This comment will address the ways in which the law is inadequate to
address male sexual victimization in the context of child support obligations, will examine the practical and legal implications of the financial responsibility on the boy and his family, and will make recommendations for
states to better balance the need to protect victims of sexual assault with the
need to provide for children. Part I will first provide some introductory
material about male sexual victimization, particularly as it is understood, or
misunderstood, in the law. Part I will then discuss the negative consequences of fatherhood in the context of statutory rape, specifically child
support obligations. It will examine statutes and public policies that sup-

Id. A.R.S. admitted to paternity. As respondent in the child support proceed5.
ing, A.R.S. also argued that he should not be responsible for the child because L.M.E. was
married at the time of conception and that he, A.R.S., had no knowledge of the child until
the paternity proceeding. Id.

6.
7.

Id.
L.M.E., 680 N.W.2d at 914.

10.
11.

Id.

8.
9.

Id.
Id.(citing Pellar v. Pellar, 443 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)).

See, e.g., County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996); Hamm v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 985 S.W.2d 742 (Ark.
1999); Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); In re Parentage of J.S.,
550 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1989); State ex rel Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993) for examples of
courts that have entered child support judgments against minor male victims of illicit sexual
conduct.
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port the imposition of a child support award for a child that resulted from
male sexual victimization, but fail to adequately protect victims. Part I will
also fully discuss the requirement that parenthood be voluntary and then
examine the ways in which courts handled, and in some cases dodged, this
issue in the context of statutory rape. Finally, this part will examine the
financial burden of child support for these young fathers and, potentially,
their families.
Part II will highlight a few examples of the law's insensitivity and inadequacy concerning male victims. It will also provide some recommendations about the need for courts to truly understand male sexual victimization
in order to adequately protect victims of statutory rape, as promised by the
adoption of gender-neutral statutory rape laws. Part II also suggests a need
for a re-examination of consent provisions, particularly how they should be
used to determine whether fatherhood is voluntary in the context of statutory rape and child support. This comment will draw the conclusion that
states need to balance their public policies that provide protection for all
sexually victimized people with child support policies that require voluntary parenthood. It will also conclude that courts need to come to a new
level of social consciousness where male victims are concerned, and that
this elevated consciousness would help states reconcile the need to collect
child support from all fathers with the need to protect male victims of sexual assault.
I. MALE VICTIMS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT PAY THE
CONSEQUENCES
A.

BACKGROUND-RECOGNIZING MALE VICTIMIZATION

In the past few decades, legislatures have created gender-neutral statutory prohibitions of certain criminal sexual conduct.' 2 In theory, these current statutes are equal opportunity prosecutors and protectors. However,
the purpose of statutory prohibitions on sex has remained to prevent the
potentially harmful consequences of teenage pregnancy to female statutory
12.
Ruth Jones, Inequalityfrom Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Supportfor Children Resulting from Their Victimization? 36 GA.
L. REV. 411, 433 (2002). Prior to the last few decades, state statutory sex prohibitions provided protection for females only, meaning that males were the only ones that could possibly
be criminally culpable under the statutes. Id. at 432-33. The new statutes provide for prosecutions of female offenders. However, it has been alleged that female offenders are not
treated as harshly as male offenders. For example, it has been argued that "authorities fail to
perceive the sexual relationship between an adult woman and a male adolescent as statutory
rape, that women are not prosecuted as often as men, and that women do not receive similar
sentences." Id.
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3
rape victims, and has continued to ignore male victimization.' In statutory
rape cases, the female victim's pregnancy itself draws attention to the
criminal sex act and the subsequent criminal culpability of the male offender/unborn child's father, but there is no such situation that will bring
4
the victimization of a young male to the spotlight.1 An increasing concern
with the correlation between statutory rape and teenage pregnancy has demanded stronger measures in enforcing state statutory rape laws against
male perpetrators. 15 While the prohibitions have seemingly remained gender-neutral, the enforcement and focus of the statutes have been glued to
the male offender because of the public policy goal of protecting female
victims and further have "reflect[ed] legislative willingness to ignore male
victimization.' 6 The apparent unwillingness to protect victimized males is
a reflection of the fact that "these policy goals are insufficient to protect
young men in a society that places little value on male virtue and little importance on male victimization." 17 State legislatures have thus focused all
their energy on protecting girls from teenage pregnancy and have ignored
fatherhood, that stem from "minor males falling prey to
issues, like teenage
'8
females."'
adult
The law's recent recognition of male victimization has, however, contributed to increased societal awareness and influenced the adoption of gen19 Studies that have examined the
der-neutral statutory rape legislation.
traumatization show that boys and girls experience sexual encounters with
relatively similar emotions; that boys and girls are similarly harmed by such
sexual conduct. 20 Research also shows that boys are sexually victimized
more frequently than statistics show and that this might be because boys are
socialized in a way that inhibits them from coming forward for fear of the
stigma of being a victim.2' While girls face the stigma of being a victim as
well, the stigma is different for boys. Boys and society alike have been
conditioned to believe that boys are supposed to enjoy all sexual encounters.22 When a boy has a sexual experience, he may not express negative
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 434-35.

15.
16. Id.at 435.
17. Id.at 433.
18. Tina M. Allen, Comment, Gender-Neutral Statutory Rape Laws: Legal Fictions
Disguised as Remedies to Male Child Exploitation, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 111, 114
(2002).
19. Id.at 114-15.
20. Id. at 114.
21. Ellen London, Comment, A Critique of the Strict Liability Standardfor Determining Child Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault and Statutory Rape, 152 U.
PA.L.REV. 1957, 1985 (2004).
22. Id.
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emotions because he has been socialized in a way that does not encourage
such feelings.23 Though gender-neutral statutory rape laws have challenged
these notions, boys may still be reluctant to report illicit sexual experiences
because of these stereotypical ideas about boys and sex.
Few studies have examined the psychological effects of male sexual
victimization, but these studies show that males who have been victims of
statutory rape have irregular school attendance records, increased drug and
alcohol use and abuse, and increased criminal behavior.24 Because of this
lack of information available to the courts, "generalizations and presumptions have been substituted for a real understanding of their sexual experience. ' 25 In other words, courts are still operating under old stereotypes
about male sexuality.26
The law has also been inadequate in addressing resulting problems
unique to male sexual victimization. This is particularly prevalent in the
context of male victims of statutory rape and teenage fatherhood. When a
pregnancy results from the sexual encounter, the minor male will undoubtedly confront a plethora of problems stemming from his victimization.28 In
addition to the shame of being a male victim, the boy will be forced to face
"the mental, emotional, and financial burdens of raising a child and the liabilities that can be incurred by not owning up to those responsibilities. 29
While gender-neutral statutory rape laws claim to protect males from the
dangers of teenage sex by allowing for the prosecutions of female offenders, they in fact fail to protect minor boys from the consequences of teenage
fatherhood when coupled with child support policies.3 °
B.

PROBLEMATIC POLICIES LEAD TO CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENTS

The ignorance of state legislatures is particularly obvious when child
support policies are enforced in situations where fatherhood resulted from
male sexual victimization. 31 In every jurisdiction that has examined the
issue, the minor boy has been held accountable to the state for child support
payments on behalf of the human result of his sexual victimization.3 2 State
child support statutes generally make no exceptions for minor fathers with
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Jones, supra note 12, at 439.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id. at 442.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Jones, supra note 12, at 433-35.
Id.at 442.
See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.

28.

Allen, supra note 18, at 114.
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regards to their duties to support their own minor children. 33 In Illinois, for
example, the applicable statute states that "[a] child's mother or a person
found to be the father of a child under this Act, is not relieved of support
minor. 34
and maintenance obligations to the child because he or she is a
The statute, coupled with the fact that child support statutes generally make
no exception for situations in which fatherhood resulted from the criminal
act of the mother, leaves no room for the release of a child support obligation for the sexually victimized father. 5
While state child support statutes create no exception for sexually victimized fathers, state public policies also support the imposition of child
support judgments against minor males. In the Illinois case of In re the
Parentageof J.S., the appellate court focused on the public policies of the
state to affirm a judgment against a minor male. 36 In J.S., the appellate
court held that Illinois public policy did not protect the minor respondent,
who was fifteen years old when the child was conceived out of illicit sexual
conduct, from his child support obligations. 37 The court also held that Illinois public policy actually supported a child support obligation against a
minor and, contrary to the minor's contention, public policy "has never
offered blanketed protection to reckless minors.",38 The court held that Illinois has recognized the unqualified right of every child to multiple forms of
support from his or her parents including, but not limited to, financial support in the form of child support payments. 39 The court concluded by stating that any public policy that protects a minor from his own irresponsible
acts does not trump the state's interest in requiring a minor father to support
his own minor child. 4°
Courts have also consistently held male victims of illicit sexual intercourse liable for child support notwithstanding that the boy was a victim
before he was a father. 4' In the Wisconsin case of In re the Paternity of
J.L.H., the court heard testimony from the victim/father's father, also a
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-1.
See, e.g., id. This statute is part of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 and pro34.
vides the minor parent's child support obligation.
Upon examining their own jurisdictions' child support statutes, courts have
35.
found that fathers are not absolved from their responsibilities to their children based on their
own minority. These courts have held that, without express exemption from the legislature,
minor victims of statutory rape are financially responsible for their children despite the statutorily proscribed conduct of the female perpetrators/mothers. See, e.g., supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
In re Parentage of J.S., 550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
36.
37.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
38.
39.
Id.
Id.
40.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
41.

33.
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practicing clinical psychologist, about the psychological effects of the sexual encounter on his fifteen-year-old son.42 The victim's father testified
that his son had been hospitalized on five occasions in one year alone because of the psychological effects of his victimization, that his son was incapable of keeping a job, and that he would probably have trouble in the
future keeping a full-time job. 43 In this case, the victim's father professionally opined that these problems resulted partly from his son's sexual victimization and should be considered in the imposition of the judgment itself."4 The court disagreed and found that any psychological or economic
consequences of the respondent's status as a male victim were irrelevant to
his status as a father or child support obligor, but did recognize that the
psychological consequences were relevant to the amount the victim was
ordered to pay.45 Though the court hinted that the award judgment could be
mitigated, it nonetheless ordered the victim to pay seventeen percent of his
income. 46 In J.L.H., the court applied the child support guidelines in a way
that defeated the purpose of statutory rape laws:
Laws that were created to protect young women from teenage pregnancy recognize that unplanned motherhood during adolescence can dramatically limit the opportunities of
teenage mothers. Yet these laws fail to address the reality
that young, unwed fathers face similar limitations on their
life opportunities by becoming fathers. Young unwed fathers have a legal duty to support their offspring and often
lack the resources--or the ability to create the resourcesto do so. By imposing financial responsibility to repay
state support for an unplanned child, the law fails to protect
rape victims from this potentially substantial
male statutory
47
harm.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 413.

In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Jones, supra note 12, at 412-13 (citations omitted). Jones goes on to say that
[m]ale statutory rape victims have also been penalized because they do
not fit the gendered paradigm of child support laws. Although today's
child support laws are gender-neutral, they have primarily been drafted
and interpreted to create rigid standards for child support liability to
compensate for the relative ease with which male parents may abandon
their parenting responsibilities.
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This child support judgment against the victimized father demonstrated the way state child support policies ignore male victims' needs for
protection from the financial consequences of fatherhood that resulted from
the sexual victimization by females.
In a similar disregard for a vulnerable, sexually victimized boy, the
Arkansas Supreme Court, in Hamm v. Office of Child Support Enforcement,
held that a boy who was thirteen years old at the time of his sexual victimization was liable for the financial support of the child, despite the fact that
the boy was legally incapable of consent pursuant to the applicable Arkansas statute. a The boy argued that because he was below the age of consent,
he could not have been "a willing accomplice ... to sexual intercourse.'49
The victim argued that the perpetrator/mother should not be able to profit
from her criminal conduct in the form of a child support payment for a child
that resulted from the sexual victimization of the father. 50 The Arkansas
Supreme Court also rejected the boy's argument based on the criminality of
conception when it disagreed with his suggestion that the equitable doctrine
of clean hands should apply. 51 The court rejected each of the boy's arguments and held that the public policy of Arkansas did not except a consenting minor who impregnated his female perpetrator from the civil obligation
of child support.52
The one dissenting justice in Hamm, Justice Corbin, stated that a thirteen-year-old boy should not be obligated to support a child born out of the
wrongful sexual conduct on the part of the mother.53 For support, Justice
Corbin looked to the intent of the Arkansas legislature that chose to criminalize this very type of conduct. 54 While the majority found the father's
argument unpersuasive, Justice Corbin agreed with him, stating: "I take
issue with the majority's reference to Scott as 'an underage consenting male
victim,' as our law provides that a person under the age of fourteen is incapable of consenting to a sexual act.",55 The dissenting justice further stated
that he had "grave doubts about the soundness of the decision to order
Scott, a child himself, to financially support the infant, Keegan, born as a
Hamm v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 985 S.W.2d 742, 745-46 (Ark.
48.
1999).
Id. at 745 (citing Miller v. State, 887 S.W.2d 280 (Ark. 1994)).
49.
50.
Id. (citations omitted).
Hamm, 985 S.W.2d at 745. The equitable doctrine of clean hands is based on
51.
the argument that, in suits involving equity, no party should benefit from their own wrong or
criminal act. In this case, the victim argued that the mother should not benefit from her
sexual misconduct. Id.
52.
Id. at 745-46.
53.
Id. at 746-47 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 747 (Corbin, J.,
54.
dissenting).
55. Id.at 746-47 (Corbin, J.,
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result of an illegal sexual encounter. 5 6 Justice Corbin described the problem with ignoring the issue of consent as it relates to the imposition of child
support in the context of male sexual victimization. 57 He articulated that an
obligation of child support in such an instance "seems to thwart that public
policy, which is clearly intended to protect young persons who are not capable of protecting themselves or making intelligent decisions about such
matters."
Justice Corbin concluded by noting that "the message such a
decision sends is that a victim of crime must pay for the criminal act of the
perpetrator." 59 This dissent articulates the concern that the state fails to
protect young male victims from criminal sexual conduct when it ignores
its policy of protecting children from victimization and holds a child ac60
countable for his own child's financial support.
By rejecting the arguments made by the victims in these cases, several
state courts have ignored their own state's public policies about protecting
children from being victims of sex crimes and the consequences of that type
of victimization. Instead, the courts have effectively punished boys for
being victims of criminal sexual conduct. 6'
C.

VOLUNTARY FATHERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF MALE SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION

Courts have interpreted child support policies to reflect the notion that
"[s]o long as a man engages in an intimate sexual act resulting in his depositing of his sperm with a woman who then becomes pregnant, he is liable
63
for child support., 62 Male victims have argued that this "strict liability
theory of child support should not apply to them. These minor fathers have
relied on several theories when arguing against the child support obligation.
In order to avoid the obligation altogether, sexually victimized minor fathers have argued that their fatherhood was involuntary, that the issue of
consent is worth consideration in terms of its relation to the voluntariness of
parenthood, and that the mother should not financially benefit from her
crime. 64 Although these arguments have been unpersuasive in the courtroom, it is dubious that they should have all been disregarded.
56.
Hamm, 985 S.W.2d at 747 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
57.
Id. (Corbin, J.,
dissenting).
58.
Id. (Corbin, J., dissenting).
59.
Id. (Corbin, J., dissenting).
60.
Id. (Corbin, J., dissenting).
61.
Id. (Corbin, J.,
dissenting).
62.
London, supra note 21, at 1957.
63.
Id. at 1958.
64. See Hamm, 985 S.W.2d at 745-47 (the father argued and the dissent agreed that
he was not a "willing accomplice" to the sexual intercourse, however, the court ultimately
disagreed with father's argument); Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1275-77 (the father argued that
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One of the most often-used challenges to these child support obligations highlights the conflict between the fundamental notion that financial
responsibility for children is based on the voluntary parenthood assumption
and fatherhood that resulted from male sexual victimization. 65 The Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin in J.L.H. said, "[i]f voluntary intercourse results in
parenthood, then for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary."' 66 In the context of statutory rape, this assumption of voluntary intercourse comes into play. It is questionable whether fatherhood that results
from a criminal sexual act on the part of the mother is truly voluntary because of the consent provision in the statutory rape statute.67 In J.L.H., the
father argued that because he was fifteen years old at the time of the intercourse, he was incapable of consent according to the statute; therefore, the
illicit intercourse could not have been voluntary.6 8 The court looked to the
"hugging, kissing, petting and other acts leading to intercourse" to infer that
the intercourse between the minor boy and the adult female was willing and
voluntary. 69 This inference is problematic in that it does not look to
whether the boy actually consented to the intercourse itself. Evidence of
consent to hugging and kissing is not evidence of consent to sex, but the
boy was unable to respond to this evidence, so the court was allowed to
make the inference of consent to the intercourse. 70 Upon examination of
the facts leading to the inference of consent, the court rendered the consent
provision meaningless when finding voluntary parenthood in the context of
he was unable to consent because of his minority age, but the court found consent irrelevant
to his status as a father, and ordered child support); J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d at 276 (the father
argued that he was incapable of consent because of his age, but the court disagreed and
found the intercourse voluntary and child support appropriate); L.M.E., 680 N.W.2d at 905
(the father argued that he was not legally old enough to consent, so parenthood was involuntary, but the court seemed unconcerned with the issue of voluntary parenthood); Nathaniel
J.,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843 (the father argued that a child support obligation inflicted an economic loss on a crime victim, but the court rejected the father's argument on theory that the
father not a typical innocent crime victim because he was a willing participant in the sexual
intercourse).
J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d. at 276.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 275. The court examined the applicable Wisconsin statute that read:
67.
[c]onsent as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. A person under
15 years of age is incapable of consent as a matter of law. The following
persons are presumed incapable of consent but the presumption may be
rebutted by competent evidence, subject to the provisions of s.
972.11(2): (a) a person who is 15 to 17 years of age ....
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4) (1979).
J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d. at 275.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 276.
70.
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statutory rape. It held that "even if a fifteen-year-old boy's parenthood
resulted from a sexual assault upon him within the meaning of the criminal
law" the parenthood is voluntary for purposes of child support. 71 The Wisconsin court held that the fact that a fifteen-year-old boy's fatherhood technically resulted from a sexual assault did not affect the voluntariness of the
intercourse and hence would not absolve him of his civil obligations to financially support the resultant child.72 This court's approach to voluntary
parenthood in the context of minor male sexual victimization is a prime
example of the way the law fails to protect boys from the dangers of statutory rape and its potentially devastating consequences by ignoring the builtin protection of the consent provision. The approach is simply articulated
as follows:
[t]he message from these cases is equally clear: If a man
intends to have sexual intercourse with a woman and a
baby results, the man is liable for child support. The sexual
intercourse in these cases is "factually voluntary" and thus
intentional,
even if it is nonconsensual in the criminal
73
sense.

The issue of consent as applied to the criminal nature of the intercourse in child support/statutory rape cases is based on the idea that in the
context of sexual victimization, consent and voluntary parenthood are inextricably linked and without sufficient consent to actual intercourse, the fatherhood is involuntary as a matter of law, and the father should be absolved of his civil responsibility to the resultant child.74
In the abovementioned case of J.L.H., the boy relied on a Wisconsin
statute, which stated that minors under fifteen years of age are presumed to
be incapable of consent to sexual intercourse, to argue that because he was
fifteen at the time of his child's conception he was legally incapable of consent.75 The problem with the boy's reliance on the consent statute was that,
although the statute states that a minor under fifteen is presumed to be incapable of consent, the presumption is rebuttable with sufficient evidence.76
The court in J.L.H. also.held that the statute was not dispositive of the boy's
civil obligations to the child but was only relevant to whether a sexual as71.
Id. at 277.
72.
Id.
73.
Laura Wish Morgan, It's Ten O'Clock: Do You Know Where Your Sperm Are?,
availableat http://www.supportguidelines.con/articles/art 199903.htm (last visited April 16,
2005).
74.
Id. Other states have rejected similar arguments. See supra note 58.
75.
Id. at 275.
76.
Id.
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sault had taken place. 77 The J.L.H. court held that consent was only relevant for purposes of the crime of sexual assault by stating that the boy
consent and was sexually
would be held liable even if he did not legally
78
victimized according to the criminal statute.
A Michigan boy made a similar argument that he should be absolved
from his child support obligation. In the Michigan Court of Appeals case of
L.M.E. & Family Independence Agency v. A.R.S., the fatherhood was the
result of criminal sexual activity that went uncharged. 79 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision to refuse the state's request for a child
support obligation. 80 The father, fourteen years old at the time of the proscribed sexual act, argued before the court that because of his age he was
incapable of consent according to the applicable Michigan statute. 8' The
applicable gender-neutral Michigan statute contains an irrebuttable pre82
sumption that a minor under sixteen years of age is incapable of consent.
The statute also precludes a defendant from raising consent as a defense
when the victim is under sixteen.83 A.R.S. argued that because he was not
legally old enough to consent to the intercourse, his fatherhood is therefore
involuntary.84 The court ultimately rejected his argument, but did say that
even if A.R.S. was a willing participant in the sex with the female offender
L.M.E., L.M.E. could still have been charged, and possibly convicted, of at
least third degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Michigan statute.85
However, L.M.E.'s conviction would have no bearing on A.R.S.'s civil
responsibility to his child.86 The court stated that the issue of whether
A.R.S. was a consensual participant in the criminal sexual conduct was not
relevant to the decision of whether he could be liable for child support under the particular circumstances.8 7 The relevant issue was whether he
77.

Rebecca Proctor Wempe, Family Law: Children Having Children-A Father's

Age is Irrelevantfor Purposes of Determining ParentalResponsibility, 33 WASHBURN L.J.

247, 254 (1993).
78. J.LH., 441 N.W.2d at 276.
680 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
79.
Id. at 910.
80.
The applicable Michigan statute. is MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
Id. at 911.
81.
750.520d(1)(a) (2004) (a victim at least thirteen years of age but under sixteen years of age).
The court also said that "[b]ecause of [father's] age at the time of the sexual conduct, the law
refuses to permit the adult in the relationship to claim consent as a defense." L.M.E., 680
N.W.2d at 911. The court found that the issue was not whether the father was a consensual
participant in the sexual activity; the issue was whether he should have to pay child support.
Id.
Allen, supra note 18, at 115.
82.
L.M.E, 680 N.W.2d at 911.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 912.
87.
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should pay. 88 The court completely dismissed the requirement that the fatherhood be voluntary and found A.R.S. responsible for child support that
resulted from intercourse that may or may not have been voluntary. This is
another example of a court skirting around the issue of consent to sexual
intercourse as it relates to the voluntary fatherhood in the context of proscribed sexual conduct.
D.

WHEN THE FEMALE IS NOT A PEER

The court's opinion in Nathaniel J. opened with the statement that
"[v]ictims have ights. Here, the victim also has responsibilities." 89 In the
California Court of Appeals case of County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel
J., a thirty four-year-old woman had criminal sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old boy and a child resulted. 90 The boy argued that the public
policy of California protects him from sexual exploitation, and hence he
should not be responsible to the state for child support when his fatherhood
resulted from an adult's violation of a statute that criminalizes that very
sexual intercourse. 9' He argued that a child support obligation "'is exactly
the exploitation which the legislature intended to prevent' because it inflicts
economic loss on a crime victim. '92 The court rejected the criminality of
the conception argument, which holds that a victim should not be liable for
the support of a child whose conception resulted from the criminal sexual
conduct of one of the child's parents. 93 Nathaniel J. cited the California
constitutional provision which states: "all persons who suffer losses as a
result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons
convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer., 94 The court ultimately rejected Nathaniel J.'s arguments because it found him to be a willing participant in the intercourse instead of an innocent victim of the crime.9 5 The
court's findings rested on the fact that Nathaniel J. admitted that he had
mutually agreeable sex with the thirty-four-year-old offender about five
times.96 The court distinguished Nathaniel J. from other victims, stating
that victims who willingly participate in the crime are not typical crime
victims and are, essentially, not entitled to the same protection as typical
88.
Id.
89.
County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
90.
Id. at 843.
91.
Id. at 844.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Nathaniel J.,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 845.
96.
Id.
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crime victims. 97 Here, while the court conceded that California public policy supports the protection of minors from being sexually exploited, 98 it set
this policy aside in favor of one that punished a fifteen-year-old boy for the
very type of victimization the California legislature intended to prevent.
In the often-cited Kansas case of State ex rel Hermesmann v. Seyer,
the Kansas Supreme Court found that a thirteen-year-old who had been
sexually victimized by his seventeen-year-old babysitter was responsible to
99
the state for child support payments for the child born to the babysitter.
The court recognized the conflict that existed between the need to protect
minors from the devastating effects of teenage sex, specifically teenage
pregnancy, and the public policy interest in holding parents financially responsible for their children.'0° This was a case of first impression in Kanissue. 10'
sas, so the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance on the
Upon examination of other jurisdictions' public policies, the Kansas Supreme Court held that Kansas had a greater interest in requiring minor parents to provide financial support for their children than its interest in protecting a twelve-year-old from sexual victimization on the part of his babysitter. 10 2 When referring to the child, the court stated that "the only truly
innocent party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of
their ages."'' 0 3 This implied that the boy is not fully innocent, even at thirteen years old. The Seyer court found that the criminal activity on the part
of the mother that led to the conception of the child in need of support
would not mitigate the boy's child support obligations.' °4
"When statutory rape law is enforced for regulatory goals, such as to
decrease the public costs of ill-considered adolescent sexual relationships, it
is reasonable to not exempt male statutory rape victims from their support
obligations.' ' 0 5 It may seem reasonable to not exempt all male victims of
statutory rape from child support obligations, especially in cases involving
peer sex. However, in cases of sexual exploitation like Hermesmann,
where the intercourse involved a boy and his babysitter, and Nathaniel J.,

Id.
97.
Id.
98.
State ex rel Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993). The boy
99.
was a victim in the technical sense of the word. The babysitter was charged with the violation of a Kansas statutory rape statute, but pled guilty to a lesser offense of "contributing to a
child's misconduct." Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1278.
100.
Id. at 1275-79.
101.
Id. at 1279.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Jones, supra note 12, at 448.
105.
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E. THE FINANCIAL BURDEN

"A child's right to support is owed by a child's parents, not the
state." 7 This quote clearly articulates this state's policy of private financial support for children. This policy of private support is based on the
theory that the best interests of a child are served by receiving support from
both of his biological parents. 10 8 In the context of statutory rape, this means
financial support obligations without consideration of the circumstances
that led to the child's conception. 0 9 The best interests of the child will always trump the protection of sexually victimized males. 10 When these
courts held that the boys were liable for child support, they really said that
the right to receive child support "is an absolute right that overrides any
interests of the statutory rape victim.""' The problematic nature of these
policies with respect to the imposition of child support judgments in the
context of statutory rape is that
[i]ts uniformly applied solution of putting the child's alleged "best interests" above the interests of the male victim
serves to further divert attention from the very issue of the
victimization. The law must be honest in facing the sexual
to hide bedynamics in such cases; it must not be allowed
2
hind the rhetoric of protecting children."
In the context of child support in cases of male sexual exploitation, the
issue is not whether it is in the best interests of the child to seek financial
support from his father." 3 Because the state is the party most often seeking
106.
107.

Id.

Laura Wish Morgan, The Child Support Obligations of Grandparents,available

at http://www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199910.html (last visited April 16,
2005) (quoting City and County of San Francisco v. Garnett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 924, 928 (1999)).
108.
London, supra note 21, at 1986-87. The author discusses the "two-parent
model" of private support. It is the idea that the two biological parents, not one or one and
the state, should financially support a child. The author argues that this model is based
partly on heterosexism in that a child is in the best situation when his biological mother and
biological father are involved in his life. London argues that the two-parent model, while
also supporting the state's economic concerns, is really part of the notion that children born
into single-parent homes are worse off than children born to two-parent homes. Id.
Id. at 1958.
109.
Id. at 1986.
110.
111.

Jones, supra note 12, at 449.

113.

Id. at 1987.

112.

London, supra note 21, at 1993.
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the judgment against the victim, the real question becomes whether it is in
the child's best interests to have his sexually victimized father reimburse
the state for funds paid on behalf of the child who was a product of the father's victimization.' 14 The answer to this inquiry requires "courts and legislators [to] resolve whether the child's interest in receiving child support
from his minor father is consistent with
the objectives of gender-neutral
5
enforcement of statutory rape laws.""
The Kansas Supreme Court in Hermesmann held that the boy should
reimburse the state for child support paid on behalf of the child produced as
a result of his sexual victimization.'" 6 The court, however, called attention
to the fact that the state sought a judgment for more than seven thousand
dollars against Seyer, but had admitted that it had no intention of ever seeking payment of the judgment." 17 The reason the state would seek a judgment against a "youngster," who had no way of paying the child support
since he was still a student when the judgment was ordered, eluded the
court.' 8 The Nathaniel J. court was also mindful of the impracticality of a
child support obligation against a minor father.' 9 The Nathaniel J. court
upheld the lower court's recommendation that Nathaniel J. not pay child
support until he reached the age of majority or finished school. 2 ° While
the courts considered the victim's age in light of the financial obligation,
they did not consider the sexual victimization, making the child support
judgments undeserved consequences of sexual exploitation."'
Furthermore, the child is usually not disadvantaged by the father's inability to pay child support in the context of statutory rape. 22 The state is
the only party truly disadvantaged because generally, in the context of male
sexual victimization, the state is seeking the child support judgment on behalf of the child. 23 The state's inability to collect child support payments
from these victimized fathers will have little impact on the child himself
because, in most cases, the child is collecting welfare benefits from the
state. If the state is unable to collect from the father, the child will likely
continue to receive benefits from the state. 1 4 The only way a child can

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Jones, supra note 12, at 459.
Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1280.
Id.

119.

Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.

118.
120.
121.

122.
123.

Id.

Id.

Jones, supra note 12, at 439.

Id. at 448.
Id.

124.
Id. at 450. When a state goes after a young father for child support reimbursement, it is usually because the mother has applied for welfare benefits for the child. Due to
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actually financially benefit from the state successfully seeking and obtaining reimbursements from the victimized father is in a situation where the
father pays more in child support than the state pays in welfare benefits on
behalf of the child.12 5 A child is not likely to benefit in this way because
statistics show that children born to poor mothers usually have poor biological fathers as well. 126 Children in these cases seem to have a doubly
hard chance at financially benefiting from their sexually victimized father's
child support payments. This is because the father is likely to be poor at the
time of conception and have a statistically more difficult chance at steady
employment because of the sexual victimization that led to the conception. 127 If the courts really examined the best interests of the children, they
would see that the children's best interests are not really served by a child
support judgment against their sexually victimized fathers. The interests
usually served in these situations are those of the state, not the best interests
of the children involved. In order to continue to justify these obligations,
the courts should articulate their reasoning differently to reflect the true
interests served by child support obligations against sexually victimized
minor fathers.
This frustration about the failure or unwillingness of underage fathers
to pay child support has led to suits against the minors' parents. 28 The
rationale behind this was articulated by a well-known family law practitioner and scholar who wrote: "[a] child's right to support is owed by anyone
the government can somehow make pay, not the state."'' 29 In Hermesmann,
the state of Kansas joined the minor boy's parents in the action seeking a
child support judgment against the sexually victimized father. 30 The state,
however, did not make its intentions clear regarding the boy's parents, and
the court never did understand why the parents of the father were joined as
defendants.' 3' This case nevertheless illustrates the reality that a sexually
victimized boy's parents may be joined in child support proceedings and
may potentially be liable for the financial consequences of their own son's
victimization.
Similarly, in Whitman v. Kiger, a North Carolina Court of Appeals
case, a child's maternal grandparents sought child support payments from
increased costs of welfare programs, states have stepped up child support enforcement in an
effort to decrease the number of benefits recipients. Id.
Id.
125.
126.
Id. at 451.
127.
Jones, supra note 12, at 451. An increased difficulty in keeping and maintaining a steady job is one of the consequences found to affect sexually victimized males. Id.
128.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Kiger, 533 S.E.2d 807, 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
129.
Morgan, supra note 107.
Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1280.
130.
131.
Whitman, 533 S.E.2d at 807.
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the child's paternal grandparents.1 32 In that case, the child's mother and
father were minors, and the father was unable to make child support payments.1 33 The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the paternal grandparents. 34 The appellate court
held that although parents have the primary responsibility of support to
their children, a North Carolina child support statute provided that "parents
of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or non-custodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support
with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated."'135 The appellate
court interpreted the plain language of the statute to mean that, in this case,
the paternal grandparents were to share the primary liability for support
with their child, 36the father of the child for which the maternal grandparents
sought support. 1

It is important to call attention to another provision in the North Carolina statute that may necessarily implicate parents of a sexually victimized
or exploited father. The applicable provision reads: "[i]f only one parent of
the child requiring support was an unemancipated minor at the time of the
child's conception, the parents of both parents are liable for any arrearages
in child support owed by the adult or emancipated parent.' 37 By including
language to describe a situation in which one parent is a minor and one is
an adult, this provision implies that the parents of a male victim of statutory
rape may be liable for the support of their biological
grandchild if their
38
himself.
by
child
his
support
to
unable
was
child
North Carolina, though, is not the only state that requires grandparents
to provide support for their grandchildren. In fact, thirteen states have
statutory language in place that serves to impose child support obligations
on grandparents. 139 In Illinois, for example, the applicable statute refers not
to grandparents but instead uses even broader language to include all "responsible relatives" as being potential defendants in a suit to collect child
support payments. 14 This type of statute erases the statutory barriers that
states normally face in attempts to collect on behalf of children. It allows
the court to go after whoever is necessary to fulfill the child support obliga132.
133.

134.

135.
136.
137.
2004).
138.
139.
DEC. TRIAL
140.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 808; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.4 (a) & (b) (West 2004).
Whitman, 533 S.E.2d at 809.
Whitman, 533 S.E.2d at 808; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.4 (a) & (b) (West
Id.
Laura Wish Morgan, Doing It Again: GrandparentsPaying Child Support, 35
37, 38 (1999).
Morgan, supra note 107, at 6.
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tions. These statutes could implicate grandparents and, in Illinois, all responsible relatives when young boys become victims and, subsequently,
fathers.
Congressional policy behind the imposition of child support against
grandparents may not be served in the context of male sexual exploitation.
The Welfare Reform Act included a provision encouraging states to impose
these obligations jointly and severally against grandparents in the event that
the non-custodial minor parents were unwilling or unable to compensate for
the financial support the state provided to their children.' 4' Congress' intent behind this provision was to encourage states to then encourage parents
to educate their children about abstinence, birth control, and the consequences of teenage pregnancy. 142 Teenage pregnancy, however, is not 43a
consequence of statutory rape when an adult female is the perpetrator.1
The imposition of child support against the paternal grandparents in that
situation would be unjust.
II.

A RE-EXAMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
MALE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION

Interests of justice require a re-examination of child support policies as
44
applied to sexually victimized and sexually exploited minor fathers.
Child support obligations imposed against male victims of illegal sexual
intercourse spotlight the law's insensitivity to the very issue of male sexual
victimization. 45 For example, in the course of the analysis about the voluntary nature of the intercourse involving a thirteen-year-old boy, the Hermesmann court noted that the boy who was having illicit sex with his babysitter did not raise any concerns about the sex to his parents. 146 Therefore,
the Kansas Supreme Court ignored the reality of male sexual victimization
when it failed to acknowledge that a twelve-year-old boy could be troubled
or harmed by his sexual experiences. 47 This comment made by the Her141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.

Morgan, supra note 139, at 38.
Id.
See generally NathanielJ., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843.
Jones, supra note 12, at 447.
London, supra note 21, at 1993. London stated that
[tihese are cases in which men were victims of sexual abuse according to
the law and were then required by the law to provide child support payments for the child conceived during the incident of abuse. This is a system that ignores the tremendous impact sexual victimization has on an
individual's life.

146.
Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1276. The court said, "[a]t no time did Shane register
any complaint to his parents about the sexual liaison with Colleen." Id. at 1277.
147.
London, supra note 21, at 1985.
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mesmann court, though small, is just one example of the law's ignorance
about male sexual victimization.
Such stereotypical comments could be avoided, or at least minimized,
through education. Education would provide the courts the necessary tools
to properly handle situations involving male sexual victimization. Studies
about male sexual victimization tend to show that boys, in general, are far
less likely to share their experiences because of fear of social stigma of
being a rape victim, anxiety over the expectation that males are not supposed to show weakness or sexual vulnerability, or a lack of acknowledgement that they were victimized.1 48 Studies also show that when boys do tell
their stories, "they are typically met with disbelief, minimization or
jokes."' 149 These studies show that the reluctance of male victims to tell
their stories or report the incidences of abuse does not mean that the boys
were not negatively affected by their experiences or that they were never, in
fact, sexually assaulted.
Another example of the law's inadequacy when it comes to protecting
these young boys is that courts assume boys are always willing participants
to sexual intercourse and are therefore financially responsible for the resultant child. This assumption is reflected in the approaches taken to determine whether fatherhood is voluntary. The heart of this insensitivity is as
follows: "[lthe courts that have considered this issue have uniformly concluded that the fact that a child results from a criminal sexual act of an adult
female with a minor male does not absolve the minor from the responsibility to pay child support."'' 50 This statement reflects the courts' disregard for
the element of consent in statutory rape situations. It says that a fifteenyear-old boy will always be considered a willing participant in sex for purposes of child support responsibility. This is a clear example of a stereotypical assumption about the aggressive nature of boys when it comes to
sex. 15' The gender-based nature of the assumption is articulated by the following statement: "[ilmagining that these were young women victimized by
male offenders reveals the extent to which these cases may have been influenced by the unstated presumptions that young men are not harmed by sex
with older women and that such interaction is desired by young men.,1 52
A re-examination of the role of consent provisions in sexual assault
statutes is required so that courts can make non-gendered, accurate determinations of whether minors really were voluntary participants in sexual
148.
Id.; Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait:Age of Consent Laws and the
Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 321-22 (Spring
2003).
149.
Sutherland, supra note 148, at 322.
150.
LM.E., 680 N.W.2d at 288-89.
151.
Jones, supra note 12, at 461-62.
152.
Id.
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intercourse and advance their policies of protecting victims of sexual assault. In drafting legislation, states should clearly define the elements of
consent so that fact-finders are not free to infer consent using other factors,
such as social stereotypes.153 By leaving little discretion to the fact-finder,
states can provide adequate protection to victims of statutory rape. An example of a consent provision that would allow courts to find consent to
intercourse under clearly defined circumstances is a New Jersey provision
that was paraphrased by its supreme court: "any act of sexual penetration
engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of sexual assault."'' 54 This requirement of affirmative consent to the
act of intercourse, coupled with strictly enforced age provisions, would
adequately protect victims and accurately determine the voluntary or coercive nature of the sexual encounter.
While courts have declared that child support obligations are dependent on voluntary parenthood, they are often reluctant to look to consent for
guidance. In fact, courts have downright ignored the voluntary fatherhood
requirement in statutory rape-child support cases. 55 In order for courts to
abide by the policies of their own jurisdictions when it comes to the financial obligations of parents and the state's obligations to victims, what better
way to determine the voluntary nature of fatherhood in this context than
with a strict interpretation of the consent provision of the applicable sexual
assault statute? If the courts applied this strictly, the practical effect would
essentially be no consent, no support.
The "irrebuttable presumption" that victims are financially responsible
56
children is particularly unjust in sexual exploitation situations
their
for
57
because the fine line between consent and non-consent becomes blurred.
In order to adequately protect children from this type of exploitation, there
needs to be "judicial recognition of areas in which authority might be used
to secure unwilling acquiescence ... ". Some states have already begun
to criminalize sex within certain specific relationships, such as those that
can be used to coerce the victim, like that of parent-child. 59 These types of
laws "reflect the notion that particular relationships may be so inherently
153.
Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory
Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287,293-94 (Winter 1997).
154.
Id. at 303.
155.
See, e.g., Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1276-77; Nathaniel J.,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
845.
156.
See generally State ex rel Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1275; NathanielJ.,57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 843.
157.
Kitrosser, supra note 153, at 320.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

authoritative and hierarchical as to make any sex within that relationship
criminally coercive. ,160 If, in the context of statutory rape, courts used consent to determine whether parental status was voluntary, then a law like this
financial
would have necessarily protected the boy in Hermesmann from
61
babysitter.
his
with
intercourse
sexual
illicit
of
consequences
The solution to the problem of male sexual victimization in the context
of child support policies "requires that family courts interpret child support
laws in a way that precludes male victims of statutory rape from being victimized further by having to pay child support for children resulting from
their victimization." 162 Legislatures should help this along by drafting child
support laws to include an express exemption for fathers when the child in
need of support was the result of sexual victimization. 63 This would be
consistent with other laws in which the legislature has expressed its intent
to mitigate the harm to crime victims and consistent with the states' purposes of gender-neutral statutory rape laws.' 64 States protect other victims
from the financial consequences of their victim statuses with victims' compensation laws. 65 The policy behind these laws is based on the theory that
the state failed to protect the victim from crime and should thus "bear the
costs," meaning mitigate the financial consequences to the victim. 166 The
cost" of a child that resulted from the minor
state therefore should "bear the
67
father's sexual victimization.
When examining welfare funds and crime victims' compensation
funds, it is clear that it may be unrealistic to require states to financially
support the children that result from their father's victimization. 68 This
lack of funding, however, should not let the state off the hook entirely. The
law could make up for this lack of funds by allowing all sexually victimized
fathers to present evidence of their exploitation and the ways in which they
were financially and psychologically harmed so that the court might consider male sexual victimization in the child support context, either in the

Id.
160.
This assumes that the boy would have been able to successfully make the argu161.
ment that babysitters are authority figures and, more importantly, that his babysitter was in a
position of authority over him. Id.
Jones, supra note 12, at 414.
162.
163.
Id. at 456.
164.
Id.
Id.
165.
Id. These laws have been supported under two theories. The first is the "shared
166.
risk" theory that stands for the notion that all citizens should share the costs and risks of
victimization. The second theory is the "moral obligation" theory that stands for the proposition that a state has a moral obligation to all crime victims. Id.
Id.
167.
168.
Jones, supra note 12, at 456.
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imposition of the judgment or the amount of the judgment. 169 This would
preclude states from making essentially an "irrebuttable presumption" that
victimized fathers should be held financially responsible for children that
170
resulted from the sexual abuse.
Though fathers may be unsuccessful in completely absolving themselves of the child support obligations, they may be able to effectively argue for a reduction in the amount of the award. Judges and justices have
suggested that a downward calculation may be appropriate in the context of
statutory rape and child support. 171 The victim's psychological health and
capacity to generate income can be considered in the calculation of the
award. 72 In order to avoid the obligation as much as possible, victims
should present evidence of the personally experienced, negative effects of
the sexual exploitation to prove that because of the sexual encounter they
are unable to financially support their children.
Another factor courts should consider when determining whether an
award of child support is appropriate is the common law notion that a
wrongdoer shall not profit from his wrongdoing. Male victims have argued
that this applies in the context of statutory rape, but courts have consistently
held that the adage does not apply. These courts have held that the criminal
culpability of the mothers does not affect the civil responsibilities of the
fathers. That conclusion is problematic in light of other holdings involving
children conceived as a result of statutory rape. For example, in Pena v.
Mattox, the Seventh Circuit in Illinois held that because the father was a
perpetrator of the sexual assault that produced his child, he had no constitutional right to father that child, and the court subsequently terminated his
rights. 173 The court denied the father's argument, stating that "we think a
state has discretion to decide whether it is better to encourage the kind of
conduct in which the plaintiff engaged by giving him parental rights or discourage it by refusing to bestow legal protection on the relationship between father and child."'' 74 It is problematic to rely on the criminality in the
Pena situation and completely ignore the criminal culpability in the context
of male victimization because they are both situations in which statutory
rape resulted in fatherhood. The legislature needs to rectify the inconsistency in the law when sexual assault results in parenthood.

169.
Id. at 462.
170.
Id.
171.
See J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d at 277.
172.
J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d at 277.
173.
Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 902 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Angela D. Lucchese, Pena v. Mattox, The Parental Rights of a Statutory Rapist, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L.
285, 292 (Spring 1997-98).
174.
Pena, 84 F.3d at 902 (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION

The law is inadequate to deal with the special circumstances created in
the context of child support and male sexual victimization. When presented
with the issue, courts have consistently held victims liable for support without adequate consideration of their statuses as victims. They have applied
child support policies in a way that ignores male sexual exploitation and
7 5 Victimized fathers have made several
effectively punishes crime victims.
meritorious arguments in attempt to avoid such obligations, but all have
been unsuccessful.1 76 Legislatures have been unresponsive to the financial
consequences of statutory rape for boys. This unresponsiveness is indicative of the ignorance of the law with regard to the issue of male sexual victimization generally. Conflicting public policies need to be reconciled in a
way that still provides for children, but does not automatically impose serious financial obligations on boys that became fathers because of sexual
victimization.1 77 Courts should look to consent provisions for guidance
when voluntary parenthood is an issue in these situations. They should
utilize the voluntary parenthood assumption that is required according to
child support policies instead of assuming that young boys are always willing participants to sex. Judges and legislatures should educate themselves
about the reality of male sexual victimization so that they can end the practice of substituting stereotypes for a real understanding of these sexual enfuture, provide the legal protection these young
counters and can, in the
78
deserve.
and
boys need
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